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Finally, the situation in Mali was rotten enough for interna-
tional intervention. First because the mujahideen of Ansar 
Dine, the Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa 
(MUJWA), along with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM), only had to exercise a little pressure at the front 
in Konna, to let the last remnants of the Malian Army 
fall apart.1 Second because the Malian Interim President, 
Dioncounda Traoré, installed after the coup d’état against 
President Amadou Toumani Touré of 22 March 2012, 
faced yet another coup d’état from this same decrepit army, 
set heavily against foreign intervention as it might upset its 
power within Mali, which led him to formally ask France 
for military support, believing he had nothing to lose.2
Undoubtedly, the French Ministry of Defense and 
French Military HQ État-Major des Armées had a plan 
ready despite President Hollande’s public assurances that 
France would not pursue a neocolonial intervention in a 
sovereign state. France has historically intervened militarily 
in West Africa whenever the situation allowed.3  In the past 
decade, Mali had become more and more part of the U.S. 
sphere of influence in Africa as U.S. armed forces trained 
Malian troops in counter terrorism operations. This was 
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without much success, as is now clear, 
but France must have looked with 
disquiet upon their loss of influence. 
Then there are the uranium mines at 
Imouraren in neighboring Niger, only 
a few hundred kilometers from the 
mujahideen controlled zone in Mali. 
A further degradation of the security 
situation in Mali would certainly pose 
a threat to these French strategic inter-
ests.
Now France is back in the game 
and with the support of the Malian 
population, at least for the moment. 
It has proven to be easy enough to 
free the cities of northern Mali from 
the mujahideen and their amputated 
interpretation of shari’a. The mujahi-
deen hardly resisted as this is not their 
strength in war. Their strength lies in 
high-speed guerilla warfare in the des-
ert, the whole desert. So what is next? 
Both the intervention itself and the 
immediate post-conflict period will 
be determined by two main issues. 
The first is the state of Malian poli-
tics, its bureaucracy, and its army. 
At present, they are all in shambles 
and the subject of foreign interven-
tions of various kinds, now and in the 
foreseeable future. The second is the 
geographic and socio-political position 
of the country. France and its allies are 
not fighting a containment operation 
in northern Mali, but a conflict on a 
Saharan scale. 
Immediately after it became clear 
that Malian soldiers were prepar-
ing to stay in power after their coup 
d’état on 22 March 2012, the Eco-
nomic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) reacted swiftly and 
efficiently with an economic boycott, 
forcing the putschists into negotiations 
and a partial restoration of constitu-
tional civilian rule, as House Speak-
er Dioncounda Traoré was installed 
as Interim President.4 ECOWAS has 
managed to keep the initiative in sub-
sequent international efforts to end 
the crisis in Mali, to the detriment of 
traditional mediators such as France 
or Algeria, but with mixed results and 
uncertain prospects.
ECOWAS is an organization which 
partly serves as a platform for West 
African states, to play out their nation-
al and regional interests and influenc-
es. Mali’s case is no different. ECOW-
AS’ main negotiator, the President of 
Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, man-
aged to have Malian Speaker of Parlia-
ment Dioncounda Traoré appointed as 
Interim President, according to con-
stitutional rule. However, the consti-
tutional legitimacy of this move has 
by now expired.5 The legitimacy of 
Malian state rule now fully depends on 
the credibility its leaders have in the 
eyes of ECOWAS and international 
leadership, possibly with destabiliz-
ing consequences. ECOWAS President 
Alassane Ouattara is the President of 
Ivory Coast, a position he won in elec-
tions intended to end a decade-long 
civil war splitting the country in half. 
Ouattara could only claim his presi-
dency after foreign intervention by 
ECOWAS and France.6 The presence 
of large numbers of Malian and Burki-
nabe immigrants played an important 
role in the Ivorian conflict, and their 
continued political presence influences 
Ouattara’s take on the Malian con-
flict. ECOWAS’ main negotiator in 
Mali, Burkina Faso’s President Blaise 
Compaoré, is one of West Africa’s 
longest-reigning dictators who has 
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to deal with a small Tuareg minor-
ity in Burkina Faso’s border area with 
Mali and Niger, a desert area easily 
accessible to the mujahideen perhaps 
still present in Mali, but soon on the 
move. These two factors undoubtedly 
leave Compaoré with security con-
cerns of his own, which influence his 
take on negotiations. The approaches 
of these two West African leaders to 
the crisis in Mali, and their direct 
interests, are therefore not necessarily 
the same, which could affect events 
on the ground. Especially Compaoré 
managed to gain a strong position of 
influence when he managed to have 
his long time friend Cheick Modibo 
Diarra installed as Prime Minister in 
April 2012.7
Further complicating the mission, 
the military coordination of the Afri-
can Support Mission in Mali (AFIS-
MA) is in the hands of Nigeria, but the 
largest contingent is delivered by Chad, 
which is not an ECOWAS member 
and which so far has over 2000 troops 
on the ground.8 Undoubtedly, Chad’s 
president, Idriss Déby Itno, did not 
send such a strong contingent to Mali 
only for humanitarian commitments 
or his desire to see Malian democracy 
restored. There are strategic positions 
to be gained here in a future denoue-
ment of Saharan politics. This might 
lead to squabbles over leadership in 
the field, which the Chadians might 
win simply because they have far more 
experience in the kind of high-speed 
desert warfare required in the Saha-
ra (a tactic they practically invented). 
Moreover, Chad is not an ECOWAS 
member, which will further compli-
cate coordination, unless the AFISMA 
mission will be transformed into a 
UN peace keeping mission, as is now 
projected.9 
Under the leadership of ousted 
President Touré from 2002 to 2012, 
Mali developed externally as a success 
story for democracy and development. 
This could not hide what was evident 
for the Malian population: the creation 
of a patronage network through which 
the political elite enriched itself by, 
among other things, participating in 
the growing international drug trade 
passing through the country.10
Few would regret that Touré’s sec-
ond presidential mandate would end 
with the upcoming April 2012 elec-
tions, in which both Interim Presi-
dent Dioncounda Traoré and former 
Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra 
ran.12 However, when these elections 
were cancelled after the putsch, neither 
man put his political rivalry aside for 
the good of the country. Instead, they 
worked antagonistically as if they were 
still engaged in the struggle for votes in 
Mali’s annulled elections.
To their credit, both Traoré and 
Diarra tried to curb the power of 
putsch leader Captain Amadou Sanogo 
behind the scenes, mainly by lobbying 
actively for international intervention. 
Sanogo feared international interven-
tion as it might lead to a restoration of 
democratic civilian rule, to the detri-
ment of his power, which he gained 
by violating Mali’s constitution and 
military law. On 10 December 2012, 
Prime Minister Diarra was arrested on 
vague accusations by the military and 
forced to step down, mainly as he had 
pleaded openly at the United Nations 
for foreign intervention.12 It is almost 
a miracle that Traoré found the cour-
age to call for French help after the 
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advance of the mujahideen in early 
January 2013 since he was clearly fac-
ing a coup d’état, a second in less than 
two years, at that same moment.
The political infighting has lowered 
Malian voters’ already low confidence 
in their government and the country’s 
democratic institutions, hampering 
the necessary confidence building in 
the new democracy that is so badly 
needed after the end of the conflict. 
Presidential elections are now pro-
jected for July 2013, but the question 
remains as to whether Mali’s old politi-
cal class will muster enough confi-
dence from voters to stay in power, or 
whether the political landscape will be 
drastically altered, making way for a 
new but inexperienced generation of 
leaders. Neither option will provide 
the necessary stability needed for the 
country’s post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts to achieve success.
As for the military, the putschists 
arrested the entire Malian General 
Staff during the coup.13 A number of 
them have been released and subse-
quently co-opted by the putchists, who 
have taken control of operations. This 
means the logistic and strategic aspects 
of national defense are in the hands of 
men hardly trained for the job. The 
Malian armed forces had two well-
trained and experienced elite com-
bat units. The best known is the air-
borne regiment, nicknamed ‘the Red 
Berets’, which also forms the presi-
dential guard. The Red Berets were 
especially loyal to ousted President 
Touré who commanded the regiment 
before entering politics in 2001. In late 
April 2012 members of this unit staged 
an aborted counter-coup, after which 
the regiment was officially disbanded, 
its members disarmed and integrated 
into regular army units under control 
of the putchists around Sanogo. Some 
were arrested and tortured. Following 
the Islamist offensive in early Janu-
ary 2013, the Red Berets pleaded long 
in vain to be reformed and sent to 
the front. Instead they were further 
engaged in violent conflict with troops 
loyal to the former junta in the streets 
of Bamako in March this year.14 Only 
in April was the regiment reformed, 
but on less than its former strength 
and probably without sufficient equip-
ment, which sheds doubt on their effi-
ciency in securing Northern Mali. 
The second elite combat unit is the 
Standing Battalion of the Gao Military 
Region, under command of Colonel 
Elhaj Gamou. Like their commanding 
officer, most men in this battalion are 
former Tuareg rebels who integrated 
the Malian Armed Forces after the 
rebellion of the 1990s. The battalion is 
complemented with an auxiliary force 
equipped from the Malian Armed 
Forces arsenals, called ‘Delta Force’ (in 
reference to US Special Forces), con-
sisting entirely of men with Colonel 
Gamou’s own tribal affiliation. These 
units are extremely loyal to the Malian 
state as they were backed by President 
Touré in recent years in their decades 
old local and very deadly struggle with 
the Tuareg Ifoghas tribe, which domi-
nates the MNLA, Ansar Dine, and 
the recently created Islamic Move-
ment of Azawad (IMA). Elhaj Gamou 
and Ansar Dine leader Iyad ag Ghali 
have been sworn enemies for over a 
decade. Gamou’s battalion defended 
the city of Kidal against mujahideen 
forces in early 2012 but were outnum-
bered and outgunned. Gamou nev-
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ertheless managed to negotiate safe 
retreat in exchange for surrender.15 
This battalion has spent much of 2012 
demobilized in Niger’s capital Niamey, 
but have remained ready to engage 
the enemy. They are in fact the only 
military unit capable of engaging their 
former brothers in arms, whose tactics 
and terrain they share. Gamou’s rein-
stated and rearmed battalion entered 
Gao alongside French troops in early 
February, and its men served as guides 
to French and Chadian forces for oper-
ations in the Tigharghar Mountains, 
but they are eyed with great suspicion 
by their Malian brothers in arms for 
two reasons. The first is that they are 
Tuareg fighters, former rebels at that.16 
The second, and more importantly 
for the future political field, is that 
Colonel Elhaj Gamou is among the 
few superior officers of the Malian 
armed forces who has not been under 
arrest or under control of the putsch-
ists. Additionally, he is very popular 
and respected by Malians despite being 
a Tuareg. This status would perhaps 
allow him to mobilize forces against 
Captain Sanogo and his henchmen, 
and even have them arrested and court 
martialed for insubordination, mutiny 
and high treason.
Whatever else was left of the Mali-
an armed forces after the coup was 
scattered by the first advances of the 
mujahideen in early January 2013. 
Rebuilding the Malian military to an 
operational level means starting from 
the ground up, restoring a well-trained 
officer corps, restoring trust between 
units, restoring the army’s loyalty 
to the Malian democratic state, and 
restoring trust between the army and 
the nation it is supposed to defend.
The mujahideen retreat from the 
cities and villages of the north has 
already led to small-scale acts of ven-
geance by civilians and army elements 
alike against people suspected of sup-
porting them. It is feared by local civic 
leaders and analysts alike that such acts 
of vengeance will develop into large 
scale ethnic violence between the vari-
ous peoples of the north: the Arabs, the 
Tuareg and the Songhay.17 The region 
witnessed similar such violence in the 
mid-1990s. Then too, the Malian army 
did nothing to protect its citizens from 
bloodshed. To the contrary, soldiers of 
Songhay origins effectively helped to 
organize and carry out pogroms, while 
soldiers of Tuareg and Arab origins - 
rebels integrated in the armed forces 
- made counter strikes against Songhay 
villages.18 It is clear by now that Malian 
soldiers have again committed acts of 
vengeance and atrocities against civil-
ian populations in the current con-
flict, leading to further fears for ethnic 
conflicts. It is unlikely that Chadian 
or Nigerian soldiers will be able to 
halt such violence once it starts. The 
deployment of Nigerian soldiers in 
ECOWAS forces in Liberia and Sierra 
Rebuilding the Malian military to an 
operational level means starting from the 
ground up.
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Leone in the 1990s has shown that they 
are more likely to become part of the 
problem than help solving it. 
What many observers do not appre-
ciate is that northern Mali forms part 
of the Sahara, an internally coher-
ent socio-political and cultural space 
with a long history of internal political 
struggles and alliances. National bor-
ders within the region are politically 
disputed and create opportunities for 
smuggling, but do not in any way 
restrict the movement of goods or 
people. Indeed fighters are able to eas-
ily move from country to country, with 
or without the tacit support of state 
organizations.
The Tuareg have been fighting for 
autonomy or independence of their 
homeland of Azawad since before 
Malian independence in the 1960s. The 
current conflict is the fourth episode in 
this ongoing struggle. They are not the 
only ones disputing existing political 
borders. The most important disputed 
border is that between Morocco on the 
one side, and Algeria and the Western 
Sahara on the other. Morocco and 
Algeria fought the undecided ‘War of 
the Sands’ over their border in 1963. 
Since then, relations between these 
countries have been extremely tense. 
Morocco annexed the former Spanish 
West Sahara in stages in the 1970s.
The annexation was directly opposed 
by the Western Saharan POLISARIO 
movement, which has been fight-
ing for national independence ever 
since, operating from Algerian soil 
with Algerian support. POLISARIO 
has been kept alive by Algeria and 
the international community. A UN-
organized referendum should decide 
on the political future of the Western 
Sahara, but this is eternally postponed 
on ever-more obscure grounds, much 
to the despair and disillusionment of 
the Sahraoui youth. Living in per-
manent refugee camps without hopes 
for a political solution or improve-
ment in their living conditions, these 
youths have turned abroad for salva-
tion. While the vast majority turn to 
Western Europe, especially Spain, a 
small minority living in the El Aayoun 
camp have turned to jihadi-salafism 
and to trans-Saharan smuggling.19 An 
unknown number of Sahraoui’s have 
integrated into AQIM and have been 
active recently in northern Mali, along 
with tribal kin from Mauritania. It 
is generally estimated that Maurita-
nian Arabs provide the vast major-
ity of mujahideen fighters active in 
AQIM’s Saharan battalions or its off-
shoot MUJWA, although part of its 
leadership is believed to be of local 
origins, especially from the Arab Lam-
har tribe.20  
Some analysts, and some jihadists, 
believe that MUJWA is supported by 
Moroccan Secret Services as part of 
its campaigns against POLISARIO.21 
Similar theories on the creation and/
or support of AQIM’s predecessor (the 
GSPC) and of AQIM itself by Alge-
ria’s intelligence service have been in 
circulation for about a decade.22 Sup-
port of either secret service for either 
movement has never been definitively 
proven or refuted.
These various political struggles 
make the political and economic prob-
lems of the vast Saharan borderland 
between Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, 
and Morocco key to understanding 
the current conflict in Mali: this region 
may be the next to explode once France 
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and its allies have managed to chase 
the mujahideen from Mali to their 
respective homelands.
The borders and border conflicts 
between Saharan states and peoples 
have never disrupted Saharan tribal 
political and commercial relations. 
The trans-Saharan and intra-Saharan 
trade has been strongly revived in the 
past decades. Efficient trucks and fast 
four-wheel-drives ship food, migrants, 
cigarettes, arms, and drugs.23 Mounted 
with extra gas tanks, 4x4’s can cross 
the vastness of the Sahara in only a few 
days, which makes the interception 
of smugglers a near-impossible task, 
which is unlikely to be carried out at 
all. Customs officers, soldiers, bureau-
crats, and politicians of the various 
Saharan states are actively involved in 
the trans-Saharan trade, or look the 
other way in exchange for a share in 
the profits.24
The various trade and smuggling 
networks in the Sahara are not nec-
essarily as strongly connected to the 
different Saharan political and military 
opposition movements as is generally 
thought, but they are at least facilitat-
ing the logistics of these movements at 
present. At the same time, they have 
provided the populations of northern 
Mali with a minimum of affordable 
bare necessities over the past months. 
Disrupting the smuggling means dis-
rupting food supplies to northern 
Mali, exacerbating an already dire food 
situation.
In addition to this commerce, the 
political world of tribal feuds and alli-
ances has remained alive and well and 
plays an important part in the current 
conflict. The tribes have modernized 
over the past decades. They form polit-
ical structures with effective political 
representation and power in the cit-
ies, as well as in the Saharan plains. 
In Libya, tribes formed the backbone 
of Khadafi’s internal politics. At pres-
ent many militias still operating in the 
country are based on tribal affiliation.25 
In Mauritania, Mali and Niger, Tuareg 
and Arab tribes constitute formal units 
of administration and local democ-
racy.26  
The living areas and political 
domains of these tribes often stretch 
over national borders. The Arab Lam-
har tribe, believed to be leading in 
MUJWA, for example, is transnation-
al in nature with many connections 
and actual tribe members living in 
southern Algeria. The same holds for 
those so-called ‘Mauritanian Arabs’ 
in MUJWA and AQIM, or those in 
Ansar Dine: many belong to tribes 
such as the Berabish, Rgeybat, Kunta 
or Tajakant, which have always lived 
dispersed between West Sahara, Mau-
ritania, Algeria, and Mali. They are 
These various political struggles make 
the political and economic problems of the 
vast Saharan borderland...key to understand-
ing the current conflict in Mali.
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not so much foreign as they are simply 
choosing between nationalities, while 
sometimes holding multiple ones. The 
mayor of Timbuktu in the late 1990s, 
for example, was a member of the 
Tikna tribe, living between Moroc-
co, Mauritania, and Mali, and he was 
locally known to hold both Moroccan 
and Malian citizenship.
Trade, tribal loyalty and jihad are 
closely intertwined. These political alli-
ances now gain shape in the form of the 
MNLA, Ansar Dine, the MUJWA, and 
AQIM, but the differences between 
these movements remain subtle and 
dependent on tribal alliances. This 
helps to explain the dynamics of the 
factional splitting and regrouping wit-
nessed over the past year, with first 
one group rapidly gaining dominance 
and then another, depending on where 
the commercial and political interests 
of the Saharan communities lie. At 
present, the Ifoghas tribe of Kidal and 
its allied Tuareg and Arab tribes from 
Mali, Algeria and elsewhere seem to 
have the upper hand again after some 
skillful political maneuvering by its 
ruling family.
But the MNLA, Ansar Dine, the 
MUJWA and even AQIM are not the 
only movements of significance in the 
Sahara. Next to tribal militias, the ongo-
ing power struggle in Libya involves a 
number of jihadi-salafi movements, 
the most notorious of which is the 
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). 
One of the spearheads of the 2011 rev-
olution, the LIFG was also implicated 
in the attack on the U.S. consulate in 
Benghazi on 11 September 2012.27 The 
date of the attack is symbolic for the 
LIFG’s declared alliance with Al-Qae-
da. Although very little is known about 
the movement and its further alliances, 
it is not unlikely that the LIFG will try 
to gain control over the unruly Libyan 
south in a coalition with local tribal 
militias, in which Tuareg from the Ajj-
er Mountains, Berbers from the Jebel 
Nafusa and Tubu from the Kufrah 
oases (get used to these names, you’ll 
read them more often in the coming 
years) play alongside Fezzani Arab 
tribes who were loyal to Khadafi and 
who have no choice for their political 
survival but to form a block against 
those who want to undo every Khadafi 
legacy in politics, including those who 
were loyal to him. Khadafi’s death has 
not dissolved all Khadafi powerbases.28
The southern Libyan Fezzan and 
Kufrah regions have been the turning 
points in trans-Saharan movements 
for centuries. Controlling the Fezzan 
means controlling a large part of the 
Sahara, something that local players 
have known for long, but which France, 
ECOWAS and other interested parties 
might realize too late. It is by now 
clear that a large part of the logistics of 
the movements in northern Mali ran 
via jihadi-salafi and tribal networks 
between Mali, Tunisia and Libya, via 
the Fezzan and the Tamesna Plain - 
a borderland between Libya, Algeria, 
Niger, and Mali entirely controlled by 
Tuareg tribesmen and international 
smuggler networks. Tuareg and AQIM 
fighters who left Libya in late 2011 to 
return heavily armed to Mali took this 
road. They were not the first, nor will 
they be the last to do so.
However impressive the advance of 
Operation Serval might have looked, 
the French and African troops moved 
at a turtle’s pace in comparison with 
the high-speed guerrilla tactics of their 
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adversaries. Moreover, where the forc-
es of Operation Serval and its suc-
cessors MINUSMA and AFISMA are 
bound by national borders, their muja-
hideen opponents feel no such restric-
tion. By the time the French arrived 
in Timbuktu, the various movements 
in northern Mali had had ample time 
to reorganize themselves, withdraw 
men and materiel into the desert, and 
move across borders. The attack of 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s new jihadi Bri-
gade ‘Those Who Sign in Blood’ at the 
gas fields of In Amenas is proof of that 
speed and tactical efficiency over a vast 
terrain.
Unless the Chadian and Nigerien 
forces within Serval teach their com-
rades how to drive a ‘technical’ combat 
vehicle at close to 200 km/h over rocks 
and through mull sand, the ECOWAS 
allies have no chance of effectively 
beating the mujahideen. They might, 
however, have managed to disperse 
them over the various Saharan states 
until the situation is ripe for them 
to return to northern Mali, or until 
the situation in southern Libya is rot-
ten enough to take over local pow-
er in ways not unlike we have seen 
in Mali in the last year. Permanent 
drone and air warfare, as waged in 
the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, 
will undoubtedly lead to many civilian 
casualties, strengthening support for 
the mujahideen as it does in Afghani-
stan and Pakistan.
France and its allies should real-
ize that they are not fighting a lim-
ited containment operation in north-
ern Mali against ‘foreign fighters’ 
that can be clearly differentiated from 
local Tuareg. They will be fighting a 
war in the Sahara against coalitions 
of various Saharan political factions 
and economic networks of national, 
tribal, economic and jihadi-ideological 
nature. Unless this viewpoint is taken 
and unless all the various alliances, 
conflicts, and political contestations in 
the Sahara are taken into account, any 
solution to the current crisis in Mali 
will be ephemeral.
Building stable - let alone good - 
governance in Mali, to say nothing of 
building a viable democracy, or estab-
lishing peace and prosperity in north-
ern Mali, will be a task of many years 
comparable to that in Afghanistan. 
The difference is that while the inter-
national community at least pretends 
to be interested in making an effort in 
Afghanistan, it has yet to realize this 
effort needs to be made in Mali on a 
similar scale.
In recent months there has been 
much talk of the “Afghanistanisation” 
of West Africa or “Africanistan”.29 
France and its allies should realize that 
they are not fighting a limited containment 
operation in northern Mali against ‘foreign 
fighters’ that can be clearly differentiated 
from local Tuareg.
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